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Abstract 
Security in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) can be achieved by 
establishing shared keys among the neighbor sensor nodes to 
create secure communication links. The protocol to be used for 
such a pairwise key establishment is a key factor determining the 
energy to be consumed by each sensor node during the secure 
network configuration. On the other hand, to achieve the 
optimum network configuration, nodes may not need to establish 
pairwise keys with all of their neighbors. Because, links to be 
established are defined by the network configuration protocol 
and as long as the network connectivity requirements are 
satisfied, number of links to be secured can be limited 
accordingly. In this sense, key establishment and network 
configuration performances are related to each other and this 
cross relation should be taken into consideration while 
implementing security for WSN. In this paper, we have 
investigated the cross layer relations and performance figures of 
the selected randomized pre-distribution and public key based 
key establishment protocols with the configuration protocol we 
proposed in a separate publication. Simulation results indicate 
that total network configuration energy cost can be reduced by 
reducing the number of links to be secured without affecting the 
global network connectivity performance. Results also show that 
the energy and resilience performances of the public key 
establishment can be better than the key pre-distribution for a 
given set of network configuration parameters. 
Keywords: Wireless Sensor Networks, Network Configuration, 
Key Establishment, Cross Layer Implementation, Security, 
Energy.  
1. Introduction* 
Security in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) is important 
for the applications where the confidentiality and integrity 
of the sensed data to be analyzed are critical. Secure data 
transfer among wireless sensor nodes can be achieved by 
securing each of the links in the communication path via a 
secret key to be used for the message encryption. 
Establishing shared keys among sensor nodes after the 
deployment is a main research area in the literature.   
 
Due to the limited power and computational resources of 
the WSN, literature has many proposed key establishment 
protocols that are mostly based on the key pre-distribution 
methods which do not require a lot of computation [1]. 
Among these methods, [2] is the first study proposing 
random key pre-distribution as an alternative to public key 
cryptography for pairwise key establishment. This work is 
known as Basic Scheme [1] and is the base for other 
probabilistic key establishment methods. The study [3] 
increased security with q-Composite scheme for small 
scale attacks but it suffers from large scale attacks since 
the network is completely compromised after a certain 
amount of nodes have been captured. [3] also proposed 
Multipath scheme and Random Pairwise scheme to 
increase resilience. However, Multipath scheme 
considerably increases the communication cost and 
Random Pairwise scheme reduces the scalability [1]. 
Another study [4] improves the communication cost by 
usage of polynomials but it increases the computation cost 
a little. [4] has a better resilience characteristic than [2] 
until a certain amount of nodes have been captured but 
when the threshold is reached the whole network is 
compromised [1]. Hierarchical method proposed in [5] 
uses polynomial based key pre-distribution proposed in [4] 
but it assumes exclusive nodes (Cluster Heads) to have a 
direct communication link with the sink and other cluster 
heads. This assumption makes the network to be 
vulnerable to single point of failure. On the other hand, if 
exclusive nodes are not assumed then this implementation 
is not practically possible for ordinary nodes since a 
wireless sensor node radio range is about 14 m when it is 
placed on the ground [6] which does not provide an 
effective cluster configuration with the direct links. 
Deployment knowledge based method [7] improves [2] but 
it increases the system complexity [1]. Besides, since there 
are assumptions with the deployment, [7] can not be 
applied to networks where there is no knowledge of the 
deployment. 
 
On the other hand, eventhough the public key 
cryptography (PKC) methods RSA (Rivest, Shamir, 
Adleman) [8] and ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman) 
[9] are accepted as they are expensive operations for a 
∗An abbreviated version of this paper appeared in [15]. 
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wireless sensor node, there are studies in the literature 
[10][11][12][13] evaluating the PKC based key 
establishment methods in WSN. In [10], RSA and ECDH 
energy consumption figures are investigated on Mica2dot 
wireless sensor nodes and [11] has extended this work to 
Mica2, MICAz and TelosB to investigate the effects of the 
RSA and ECC energy costs to sensor nodes lifetime. In 
[11] it has been concluded that the energy costs of 
asymmetric key establishment and even signature 
operations are not that critical, especially for Elliptic 
Curve Cryptography (ECC), compared to the total energy 
resources that these sensor nodes have. In [12] a 
configurable library, namely TinyECC, as an 
implementation of ECC for WSN has been proposed. 
TinyECC operates on a standard operating system TinyOS 
[14] which is suitable for common sensor platforms. A 
most recent study [13] has proposed a method which is an 
optimized implementation of ECDH key exchange for 
MICAz motes which also runs on TinyOS [14]. In [13] it 
has been figured out that the ECDH key exchange 
operation on the elliptic curve over a 192-bit prime field 
would have the key exchange energy cost of 57mJ per 
node which allows 117.000 key exchange operations for 
each node before running out of battery [13]. 
 
The main purpose of these key establishment protocols is 
to establish shared keys among sensor node pairs that 
might communicate and link to each other after the 
deployment to produce a connected network.  From the 
network configuration point of view, some of these 
protocols [2][3][4] have been evaluated independently 
from the underlying network structure. However, if the 
network configuration requirements are also considered, 
assumptions made for the analysis of these protocols may 
not be applicable or their costs may not be acceptable for 
some WSN applications. For example, high node degree 
assumptions necessary for the key pre-distribution 
protocols [2][4] may not be practical due to the wireless 
medium efficiency. Besides, the high node degree 
requirement increases the total system cost per square area 
and this may not be acceptable for some WSN applications 
targeting large area coverage. Conversely, since the 
resources are limited, any limitation in the network 
configuration may affect the security level of the system 
which may require a configuration change in the key 
establishment protocol. Moreover, this change may not be 
enough to provide the desired security level.  
 
On the other hand, cross layer relations of the key 
establishment and network configuration protocols may 
affect the system performance in a positive manner. For 
example, there can be some reduction in key establishment 
costs since the number of links to be established during the 
network configuration may be lower than the expected 
number of secured links assumed for the analysis of key 
establishment protocols. Therefore, building the cross 
layer relations with the network configuration protocol is 
necessary to evaluate the real performance of key 
establishment protocols.  
 
In this paper we have investigated the cross layer relations 
and performance variations of the selected key 
establishment protocols together with the network 
configuration protocol proposed in [16] This network 
configuration protocol is a self organizing multi-hop 
clustering protocol which has been developed for 
homogenous WSNs to have maximum network 
connectivity with minimum node density (it provides the 
global connectivity of 98% with the minimum node degree 
of 7 [16]). This low node degree feature is important since 
it reduces the total system cost per unit area and eliminates 
the drawbacks of wireless medium limitations of dense 
networks stated in [17]. The protocol does not assume 
special sensor nodes having exclusive features like 
processing power, energy or extended radio range. Since it 
operates well with low node densities, to have the total 
network deployment cost per unit area as low as possible, 
the key establishment protocol to be implemented should 
provide the desired neighbor connectivity by increasing 
the probability of establishing secure links among 
neighbors as much as possible. Regarding these 
constraints, the key establishment protocols whose cross 
layer performances have been analyzed in this paper are 
based on key pre-distribution and PKC. The reference key 
pre-distribution protocol selected is the BS (Basic Scheme) 
[2] since it has been accepted as flexible, efficient, and 
fairly simple protocol while also offering good scalability 
[1]. We have selected Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman 
(ECDH) protocol for the PKC analysis since ECC is the 
most cost effective PKC solution suitable for WSN [11].  
 
In this work, we have proposed three different link key 
setup procedures namely straight, reactive and proactive to 
establish the cross layer relation with the network 
configuration protocol by using its state control 
mechanism. Simulation results indicate that the cost of the 
key establishment protocols in WSN can be improved by 
controlling the number of links to be secured per sensor 
node, while keeping the global connectivity performance 
of the network configuration protocol at an acceptable 
level. Then we have analyzed the performance trade-offs 
of both key establishment protocols BS and ECDH 
implemented on the network configuration protocol [16]. 
The overall storage, computation, communication cost 
comparisons and resilience performances indicate that for 
the lowest physical node degree needed for 99% network 
connectivity, ECDH is a better choice if large scale 
networks are considered. For the small scale networks BS 
would be preferred but ECDH can still be a choice over 
BS since the total configuration energy costs are 
IJCSI International Journal of Computer Science Issues, Vol. 8, Issue 6, No 2, November 2011 
ISSN (Online): 1694-0814 
www.IJCSI.org 87
  
comparable. As the physical node degree increases then 
the energy cost of BS is becoming lower because of the 
reduced communication bandwidth usage. However 
ECDH can still be a preferred choice if the network 
resilience is the main concern. Finally we have analyzed 
the authenticated key establishment costs of signature 
schemes RSA [8] and ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital 
Signature Algorithm) [9] together with ECDH.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, 
background information has been given. In Section 3, 
cross layer implementations of key agreement and network 
configuration protocols have been provided. In Section 4, 
simulation results have been given and conclusions are 
drawn in Section 5.   
2. Background 
In this section brief information on the protocols under 
concern has been given; the network configuration 
protocol proposed in [16], key establishment protocols BS 
[2] and ECDH [9]. 
2.1 Network Configuration Protocol 
The network configuration protocol proposed in [16] is a 
multi-hop self organizing clustering protocol which 
organizes the network in a spanning tree form with an 
iterative heuristic. This configuration protocol is suitable 
for WSN requiring low node degrees starting from 7. 
Protocol basically starts with an initiator and grows with 
only local decisions based on the discovered neighborhood 
status. Once the first cluster is created, border members 
select new initiators for the configuration of new clusters. 
Among the responded nodes, one with the closest 
proximity and suitable neighborhood status is chosen as 
the new initiator. Then this node starts new cluster 
extension.  
 
During the configuration every node in the network runs 
the same protocol state machine. There are five states for a 
sensor node which also define the node types namely, 
floating, initiator, node, gateway_c and gateway. At the 
beginning all the nodes are in floating state and they wait 
for an invitation from one of their already configured 
neighbors. A simplified state machine of this protocol is 
provided in Fig. 1. 
 
State control mechanism of the network configuration 
protocol is as follows: In the floating state, a node may 
receive a configuration message from one of its already 
configured neighbors. After a configuration message is 
received any floating node first changes its state and starts 
neighbor discovery operation immediately. To discover its 
neighbors, first broadcasts a polling message and waits 
(one time interval) for the replies from its one hop 
neighbors, then it counts its neighbors and takes the 
corresponding action depending on the configuration 
message it received. For example, if this message is sent 
for starting a new cluster, then the state of the receiving 
node is changed to initiator. If the configuration message 
declares that the receiving node is an inner cluster 
member, then this node changes its state to node and 
continues extending the cluster with only its floating 
neighbors if they exist. If the receiving node is a cluster 
border member, then it changes its state to gateway_c and 
starts gateway decision algorithm defined in [16]. If this 
node finds itself as the best candidate among the other 
gateway candidates, then it changes its state to gateway 
and tries to select one of its floating neighbors as the 
initiator of the next cluster to be extended. Otherwise the 
state is changed to node and this unit stops its 
configuration process. This iteration stops when there is no 
further expansion is possible. When the protocol 
completes, an inter-cluster spanning tree is generated 
where the clusters created are the nodes of this spanning 
tree. 
 
 
2.2 Basic Scheme (BS) [2] 
In this protocol, each node randomly picks a subset of keys 
(i.e. key ring) from a large key pool and any pair of nodes 
can establish a secure connection if they share at least a 
common key in their key rings. The basic protocol 
operation consists of three phases. In pre-distribution 
phase a set of keys randomly selected from the key pool is 
stored in each sensor node, before the deployment. In 
shared key discovery phase, after the sensor nodes are 
deployed, each node checks its neighbors to see if they 
have a common key in their key rings. In path key 
discovery phase, if the originator does not have shared 
keys with some of its neighbors, it asks for path keys from 
 
 
Fig. 1 Finite state machine of the network configuration protocol [16]. 
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the neighbor nodes that have a shared key with it. The path 
keys received are sent to those neighbors having no shared 
key with the originator and secure node connectivity is 
increased further.  
 
The probability p that two nodes share at least one key in 
their key rings of size k chosen from a given pool of P 
keys is defined in [17] as: 
 
( ) ( )
( )( )2/12
2/12
/21
/11 +−
+−
−
−
−= kP
kP
Pk
Pkp                                     (1) 
 
If we define d as the physical node degree of the network, 
then the expected number of neighbors establishing link 
key in shared key discovery is pd and it is (1-p)(1-(1-p2)d)d 
for path key discovery. Here we assume that only single 
hop neighbors are used for path key discovery.  
 
Based on this probabilistic scheme, the local connectivity 
and global connectivity relations first investigated in [17]. 
This work states that the local connectivity requirements 
of random graphs can be reduced if a global connectivity 
of less than 100%, for instance 98% is targeted. In [17], 
there are also two methods defined for path key discovery 
phase of the randomized key pre-distribution protocols 
namely cascade-off and cascade-on counting. With the 
cascade-on counting, all the nodes establishing a path key 
with the originator in one round of the path key discovery 
are counted as the new shared key neighbors of this 
originator in the following round. This operation 
terminates when there is no non-secured neighbor left or 
no new neighbor having established a path key with the 
originator in the last round of the path key discovery. With 
the cascade-off counting, there is only one round of path 
key discovery and the neighbors who have established a 
session key with the originator in the shared key discovery 
phase are used for the path key setup. 
2.3 Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) 
ECDH public key establishment protocol requires two 
point multiplications and one message per unit for the 
shared key establishment. The first point multiplication is 
for calculating the public key Pu from the unique private 
key P. After having (P, Pu) pairs, each node u and v starts 
messaging for session key establishment, u sends its public 
key to v, u→v:{Puu}and v sends its public key to u, 
v→u:{Puv}. Then, each node computes the shared key 
Klink via the second point multiplication as:  
     
vulink PuPK = , uvlink PuPK =                                              (2) 
 
In addition, there are signature protocols RSA and ECDSA 
defined for authenticating the public keys to defeat the 
man in the middle attacks. Recent works indicates that 
implementation of these signature protocols on wireless 
sensor nodes are possible [10][11][12] and there are 
software libraries developed [12]. More generally, 
signature generation and verification operations of these 
protocols have different asymmetrical computation costs 
for each [11]. Generation of signatures is handled by a 
trusted party which can be called as Certificate Authority 
(CA). For this operation, public key of each node is signed 
by the private key of CA and the signed copy is loaded to 
the corresponding node. Then, each communicating node 
verifies the signature by using the public key of the CA to 
authenticate the public key of the sender. In WSN this CA 
can be the base station or any other powerful device in 
which all the signed copies of the public keys can be 
calculated and copied to the corresponding nodes before 
the deployment. After the deployment, the sensor nodes 
can verify any of its neighbor signatures by using the 
public key of the signing unit. 
3. Cross Layer Implementations of Key 
Agreement Protocols with the Network 
Configuration 
In this section we provide the design details of the cross 
layer implementations of key establishment protocols over 
the network configuration protocol proposed in [16]. We 
first detailed the implementation of the BS and then, the 
details of ECDH implementation have been given.  
3.1 Implementation of Basic Scheme (BS) 
Cross layer implementation of BS over the configuration 
protocol [16] requires additional communication messages 
in the neighbor discovery phase. The configuration 
protocol states that, any floating sensor node receiving a 
configuration message starts neighbor discovery operation. 
During this phase, states of the sensor nodes in the 
neighborhood are registered and cluster extension is 
managed with only the floating neighbors. Pre-distributed 
key rings are checked in this phase and the neighbors, 
sharing at least a key, participate in the next steps of the 
network configuration protocol.  
 
Key pool size P and key ring size k of BS define the 
probability p as in Eq. (1). Then, by changing these 
parameters, the number of neighbors that can be connected 
securely can be controlled. However, this affects the cost 
of storage and transmission.  
 
Transactions for the basic BS implementation in neighbor 
discovery phase of the configuration protocol have been 
illustrated in Fig. 2. Here any configured sensor node A 
starts neighbor discovery by broadcasting a polling 
message first (Fig. 2-I). This message includes kA which is 
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the list of key indexes included in the key ring of A. 
Receiving neighbors ni (i=1,2,...,d ; d is the expected node 
degree) compare kA with their key rings ki. If there is at 
least one key index match, then the corresponding 
neighbor replies to A with this number idxi (Fig. 2-II). This 
reply is the confirmation of the link key between A and the 
node i. The expected number of neighbors finding a 
common key after the shared key discovery is pd. So there 
are (1-p)d neighbors cannot find a shared key with kA. 
These neighbors reply with the list of their key indexes ki 
(i=1,2,…,(1-p)d) which are to be used in the path key 
discovery phase (Fig. 2-II). After receiving all replies, A is 
able to register its neighbors according to their key sharing 
status. Depending on the probability p, if there are 
neighbors that could not established a link key, A starts 
path key discovery process through its pd secure neighbors 
which have a common key with A. In this phase, A 
broadcasts the list of key indexes ki (i=1,2,…,(1-p)d) 
received in shared key discovery phase together with the 
corresponding node id numbers idi (Fig. 2-III). After 
receiving this message, each of the pd secure neighbors 
check their key index lists and prepares a path key for each 
one if there is at least a common key found. Then, each 
path key is sent to A in two copies which has been 
referenced as KPK in Fig. 2. One copy is encrypted with 
the link key of A and the other is encrypted with the key 
shared with the corresponding key ring i.e. indirect 
neighbor (Fig. 2-IV). Each KPK pair has been associated 
with also the target neighbor id and its key ring index 
number for the link key establishment. In these reply 
messages, there can be multiple path keys KPK defined for 
a single neighbor ni. In this case, A selects only one of 
them. Then, the corresponding path key Ki is sent to the 
corresponding neighbor with its key index number idxi 
where i≤ (1-p)d (Fig. 2-V). If cascade-off counting is 
selected, key setup process terminates at this point. 
Otherwise, if there are neighbors that still cannot establish 
a path key, then A starts a new path key discovery iteration 
starting from the step Fig. 2-III. New iteration includes 
also the last added neighbors in the previous path key 
discovery as the shared key members. This loop terminates 
when there is no unsecured neighbor left or no new 
neighbor added after the last path key discovery process 
(cascade-on counting). 
 
Per node energy cost of this key establishment scheme can 
be divided into two parts as communication and 
computation costs. For the analysis, only the single hop 
neighbors for path key discovery is considered and 
cascade-off counting has been applied.   
3.1.1 Communication Cost of BS 
Lemma 1: In shared key discovery phase any sensor node 
vi (i = 1,2,3,…,n) makes a single broadcast and Eneighbor 
unicasts, where Eneighbor is the expected number of physical 
neighbors that are a single hop away from vi. 
 
 
 
Proof: At the beginning, each sensor node is in the 
floating state and waits for the configuration message from 
one of its already configured neighbors. In the network 
configuration protocol, a node changes its state from 
floating and starts neighbor discovery operation only after 
a configuration message is received. Consequently, any 
node vi receives a single valid configuration message and 
makes a single broadcast for neighbor discovery during the 
network configuration. As a result, any node vi receives a 
single broadcast message from each of its single hop 
neighbors (
neighbor
uuuu Ε,...,,, 321 ) and unicasts the replies 
including its state information. Each reply includes also 
the key ring indexes of the node if there is no shared key 
found in the configuration message. Total number of these 
reply messages that vi transmits varies with the expected 
number of physical neighbors which is Eneighbor. As a 
result, total number of transmitted messages from vi for 
neighbor discovery equals to 1+ Eneighbor    
 
Lemma 2: In shared key discovery phase any sensor node 
vi (i = 1,2,3,…,n) makes a single broadcast and Eneighbor 
unicasts, where Eneighbor is the expected number of physical 
neighbors that are a single hop away from vi. 
 
Proof: At the beginning, each sensor node is in the 
floating state and waits for the configuration message from 
one of its already configured neighbors. In the network 
configuration protocol, a node changes its state from 
floating and starts neighbor discovery operation only after 
a configuration message is received. Consequently, any 
node vi receives a single valid configuration message and 
makes a single broadcast for neighbor discovery during the 
 
 
Fig. 2 Message transactions for BS. 
 
 
 
A 1,2,3,…,d
[kA]
[idx1], [idx2],…,[idxpd]
[k1], [k2],…, [k(1-p)d]
[id1||k1, id2 ||k2,…, id(1-p)d||k(1-p)d]
[id1||idx1||KPK, ,…, id(1-p)pd
||idx(1-p)pd||KPK]1,
[idx1||K1], [idx2||K2],…, [idxi||Ki] | i≤ (1-p)d
I
II
III
IV
V
[id1||idx1||KPK, ,…, id(1-p)pd
||idx(1-p)pd||KPK]pd…
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network configuration. As a result, any node vi receives a 
single broadcast message from each of its single hop 
neighbors (
neighbor
uuuu Ε,...,,, 321 ) and unicasts the replies 
including its state information. Each reply includes also 
the key ring indexes of the node if there is no shared key 
found in the configuration message. Total number of these 
reply messages that vi transmits varies with the expected 
number of physical neighbors which is Eneighbor. As a 
result, total number of transmitted messages from vi for 
neighbor discovery equals to 1+ Eneighbor    
 
Lemma 3: In shared key discovery phase any sensor node 
vi (i = 1,2,3,…,n) receives Eneighbor broadcast and Eneighbor 
unicast messages. 
 
Proof: From Lemma 1, each node vi makes a single 
broadcast for neighbor discovery. This message is received 
by each of Eneighbor nodes (
neighbor
uuuu Ε,...,,, 321 ) and these 
nodes unicast a reply message in return. In this case, there 
are Eneighbor unicasts received by vi. On the other hand, vi 
receives a single broadcast from each of its single hop 
neighbors 
neighbor
uuuu Ε,...,,, 321  which has been sent once 
for neighbor discovery. As a result, there are total of 
Eneighbor broadcast messages received by vi.    
 
Lemma 4: The total cost for messages transmitted from 
each node vi (i = 1,2,3,…,n) is calculated as below:  
 
+Ε++=Μ sreplypollneighborpkpollskpolltx pLLLCC tx ____ ((     
         )))2/)(1( __2_ keyaskkeyaskneighborreplypoll LLpLp +Ε+−     (3)    
    
 ( txC : radio transmission cost per bit, skpollL _ : broadcast 
message length in shared key discovery phase, pkpollL _ : 
broadcast message length in path key discovery phase, 
sreplypollL __ : Length of a reply message for shared key 
information, replypollL _ : Length of a reply message for no 
shared key information and keyaskL _ : Length of unicast 
messages transmitted for path key establishment) 
 
Proof: As it is given in Lemma 1, each node vi transmits a 
single broadcast message in shared key discovery phase 
and there is another broadcast message transmitted in path 
key discovery which includes the key rings of unshared 
key members. The bit length of these messages are 
skpollL _  and pkpollL _  respectively. Each node vi replies to 
these broadcast messages received from neighborΕ  nodes 
after checking the shared key status with the received key 
ring indexes. Hence, vi sends only the shared key index to 
neighborpΕ  nodes and its key ring indexes of length k to 
neighborp Ε− )1(  nodes. The bit length of these messages are 
sreplypollL __  and replypollL _  respectively. Additionally, 
each vi unicasts its reply to maximum of neighborpΕ  
broadcast messages with maximum of neighborpp Ε− )1(  
path keys included in each reply. Here, each path key 
message length is keyaskL _ . Lastly, the length of the 
message for sending the encrypted path keys to 
neighborp Ε− )1(  neighbors is 2/_ keyaskL . As a result, total 
unicast message length transmitted is:  
 
replypollsreplypollneighbor LppL ___ )(1(( −+Ε               
            ))2/__2 keyaskkeyaskneighbor LLp +Ε+                            (4) 
 
Since the total broadcasted message length is calculated as 
pkpollskpoll LL __ + , by using Eq. (4), total message 
transmission cost for a node is calculated as below: 
 
+Ε++=Μ sreplypollneighborpkpollskpolltx pLLLCC tx ____ ((                
           )))2/)(1( __2_ keyaskkeyaskneighborreplypoll LLpLp +Ε+−    
 
Lemma 5: The total cost for messages received by each 
node vi (i = 1,2,3,…,n) is calculated as below where, p is 
the probability that two nodes share at least one key in 
their key rings and n is the total number of nodes in the 
network. ( rxC : radio reception cost per bit) 
 
+++Ε=Μ sreplypollpkpollskpollneighborrx pLLLCC rx ____ )((         
           ))2/)(1( __2_ keyaskkeyaskneighborreplypoll LLpLp +Ε+−     
(5) 
 
Proof: At first, each node vi in the network receives the 
broadcast messages pkpollskpoll LL __ +  defined in Lemma 
3. In addition, vi receives reply messages from its 
neighbors in return to its previously transmitted broadcast 
messages. Firstly, it receives shared key list index (
sreplypollL __ ) from neighborpΕ  neighbors and key ring 
indexes of length k ( replypollL _ ) from neighborEp)1( −  
neighbors after its broadcast for shared key discovery. In 
path key discovery phase, vi receives path keys ( keyaskL _ ) 
for at most neighborEpp )1( −  neighbors from each of 
neighborpE  neighbors. Finally, the path key ( 2/_ keyaskL ) is 
received from each of at most neighborEp)1( −  neighbors. 
As a result, total unicast messages received is: 
 
)1(( __ ppL sreplypollneighbor −+Ε                       
           ))2/( __2_ keyaskkeyaskneighborreplypoll LLpL +Ε+             (6) 
 
Since the received broadcast message length is 
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)( __ pkpollskpollneighbor LLE + , by using Eq. (6), total 
message reception cost is calculated as below where Crx is 
the radio reception cost per bit: 
 
))(( ____ +++Ε=Μ sreplypollpkpollskpollneighborrx pLLLCC rx   
           )2/)(1( __2_ keyaskkeyaskneighborreplypoll LLpLp +Ε+−    
 
Then, by using the results of Eq. (3) and Eq. (5), the total 
messaging cost of each node vi (i = 1,2,3,…,n) for secure 
link establishment is calculated as below: 
 
rxtxneighbor MMM
CCC +=                       (7)  
3.1.2 Computational Cost of BS 
The computational costs of the BS are the encryption and 
decryption costs of path keys during path key discovery. 
During the path key establishment each node vi decrypts at 
most (1-p)d path keys received from its shared key 
neighbors. In addition, each node performs encryption for 
each of (1-p)d key rings received from each of d neighbors 
with the probability of p2 for sharing key with the key ring 
and the originator node. This encryption is made twice, 
one for the originator and the other for the node who needs 
the path key. Then, the total number of encryptions is 
calculated as 2p2(1-p)d2 and the resulting cost is given as: 
 
decencncomputatio dpdppC ))1(())1(2(
22 −+−=                    (8) 
3.1.3 Total Energy Cost of BS 
The message payload structure used in the energy cost 
analysis of the BS is: 
 
},,{,,,: MIDIDMACMIDIDBA BABA→  
 
In this structure, ID is the network wide unique 
identification number of each sensor node. We have taken 
ID length as 16 bits to handle the large scale networks (ie. 
> 512). M includes the keys, key lists and corresponding 
ID numbers attached and the length of this part is variable. 
Here, the MAC (Message Authentication Code) is 
calculated by using SHA-1 and it occupies 160 bits in the 
payload. The encryption/decryption protocol referenced is 
AES 128 which has the corresponding key length of 128 
bits. For this analysis the key pool size is taken as P = 
10.000 which corresponds to 16 bits key ring indexes. The 
energy cost equation is derived as a function of the key 
ring size k.   
 
Before starting the analysis, we need to define the length 
of each messages used in communication cost analysis of 
BS. The skpollL _  sent for the shared key discovery 
includes the indexes of the keys stored in A and it has the 
length of 2k bytes. The replypollL _  message is a reply to 
skpollL _  and it includes the key ring index list of the sender 
if there is no shared key found. This message also has the 
length of 2k bytes. If there is a shared key, then the 16 bits 
index number of the shared key ( sreplypollL __ ) is replied. 
pkpollL _  message sent in path key discovery includes the 
ID numbers (16 bits) and key index lists  of the neighbor 
nodes ( skpollreplypoll LL __ = ) sharing no key with A after the 
shared key discovery. The number of these nodes depends 
on the probability p and node degree d as below: 
 
)2)(1( __ +−== skpollpkpoll LpdLM                                  (9) 
 
Any neighbor node generating the path key, encrypts it 
with the key shared with the originator and the key shared 
with the target node. These two encrypted keys are then 
sent to the originator node. This message is keyaskL _ and it 
includes two pieces of 128 bits of encrypted keys, 16 bits 
ID of the target node and 16 bits index number of the key 
to be used for decrypting the encrypted path key in that 
node. The originator sends the corresponding encrypted 
copy (128 bits) to the target node for path key 
establishment together with the index number (16 bits) of 
the key to be used for decrypting the key in that node. 
Lengths of these messages are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Basic Scheme (BS) message lengths 
Symbol Message Length (bit) 
Lpoll_sk 16k 
Lpoll_reply 16k 
Lpoll_reply_s  16 
Lpoll_pk d(1-p) (Lpoll_sk  + 16)  
Lask_key 2(16+128) 
 
Now we can calculate the total energy cost of the BS for a 
single node. In addition to the message types M defined, 
each payload includes also ID numbers of the 
sender/receiver and the MAC part which is 160 bits SHA-
1 output of the IDs and M. Thus, the Eq. (3) and Eq. (5) 
can be rewritten as below: 
 
+++−++=Μ 192)1616)(1(19216( kpdkCC txtx                
         )))33648019216)(1(208( 2 +++−+ dpkppd        (10) 
 
+++−++=Μ 192)1616)(1(19216( kpdkdCC rxrx        
          ))33648019216)(1(208 2 +++−+ dpkpp            (11) 
 
In [10] and [11], the Rx/Tx radio communication and AES 
128 calculation costs of Mica2dot sensor nodes have been 
given and the reference values taken for the analysis are 
provided in Table 2 and Table 3 respectively. Here, the per 
bit energy costs given in Table 2 define the Ctx and Crx 
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costs included in our analysis.  
 
Table 2: 868 Mhz Rx/Tx costs for Mica2dot 
Radio Energy 
Crx 0.750 μJ/bit 
Ctx (5 dBm) 1.984 μJ/bit 
Table 3: Symmetric computation costs for Mica2dot 
Computation 
Type Energy 
AES128enc  1,62 μJ/byte 
AES128dec 2,49 μJ/byte 
SHA-1 5,9 μJ/byte 
 
The total amount of AES 128 computations is defined in 
Eq. (8). Each of these computations is done for 128 bits = 
16 bytes keys, so the total computation cost can be 
rewritten as below:  
 
decencncomputatio dpdppC 16))1(2(16))1(2(
22 −+−=              (13) 
 
Then, by using the equations Eq. (10), Eq. (11), Eq. (12) 
and Eq. (13), the overall per node energy cost of BS for vi 
(i = 1,2,3,…,n) is calculated as below: 
 
ncomputatioMionconfigurat CCCCC SHArxtx +++= −ΜΜ 1                      (14) 
3.1.4 Cross Layer Implementation of BS  
In BS, securing all the physical neighbors for each sensor 
node would give the highest network configuration 
performance. However, the communication and 
computation costs are higher in this case. Instead, only the 
required neighbors which are in floating state can be 
selected for establishing secure links while extending 
clusters. This reduction would improve the communication 
costs and hence the computation costs because of the 
reduced MAC computations. We have defined three 
different methods for selection of links to be secured as 
proactive, reactive and straight.  
 
--With the proactive selection, the links to all the physical 
neighbor nodes are tried to be secured in shared key and 
path key discovery phases (uses cascade-on counting).  
 
--With the reactive selection, the links with only floating 
neighbors are tried to be secured in shared key discovery. 
If all of them cannot be secured, then the path key 
discovery process is applied for the remaining floating 
neighbors just once (uses cascade-off counting).  
 
--Straight selection only considers the neighbors having 
shared keys discovered in the shared key discovery phase 
and path key discovery does not run in this mode.  
 
The algorithm of this cross layer implementation of BS is 
given in Table 4. This algorithm is included in the 
neighbor discovery part of the configuration protocol. 
Since the algorithm defines the links to be securely 
established during the neighbor discovery, after its 
completion, the network configuration protocol continues 
its operation with the neighbors having shared keys. 
Simulation results of these implementations and their 
impacts on security and network configuration 
performance have been provided in Section 4. 
Table 4: BS cross layer implementation algorithm 
Assumptions: Network is G = (V;E), there is no node failure during configuration 
1:  BEGIN: 
2:       i ← 0;  j ← 0; new_neighbor_added ← 0 
3:       BROADCAST poll with kv for neighbor discovery and start neighbor        discovery timer 
4:       RECEIVE poll_reply from u 
5:       if shared key reply then 
6:            ADD u∈V to neighbor list as a shared key neighbor 
7:            i ← i + 1  
8:       else 
9:            ADD key ring ku and state of u∈V to neighbor list 
10:            j ← j + 1  
11:       endif 
12:       WAIT neighbor discovery timer out 
13:       if straight_method then 
14:           goto END 
15:       else if reactive_method then 
16:           if there is no floating neighbor in j neighbors  then 
17:               goto END 
18:           else  
19:               BROADCAST key rings k of only floating unsecured neighbors for                 path key discovery 
20:       else if proactive_method then 
21:           BROADCAST key rings k of all unsecured neighbors for path key            discovery 
22:       end if 
23:  PATH KEY DISCOVERY: 
24:       RECEIVE path keys KPK  from each u1,2,…,I 
25:       for selected j neighbors uj∈V of v do 
26:           if one Kj exists in K PK  then 
27:               SEND Kj to uj as the shared key 
28:               ADD uj  to neighbor list as a shared key neighbor 
29:               i ← i + 1  
30:               j ← j - 1  
31:              new_neighbor_added ← 1 
32:           end if 
33:       end for 
34:       if proactive_method and j > 0 and new_neighbor_added then 
35:           BROADCAST key rings k of all unsecured neighbors for path key            discovery 
36:           new_neighbor_added ← 0 
37:           goto PATH KEY DISCOVERY 
38:       end if 
39:  END: 
3.2 Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) 
The cross layer implementation of ECDH key exchange 
over the configuration protocol [16] requires no additional 
messaging. The implementation is simple since the 
transaction between any node pair only requires the 
exchange of public keys Pu to calculate the shared key for 
that link. As it is depicted in Fig. 3, A first broadcasts a 
polling message for neighbor discovery which includes 
also its public key PuA. Then, all the receiving neighbors 
ni (i=1,2,...,d) add their public keys Pui in their reply 
messages. The bulk of the cost in this operation is the 
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point multiplication of neighbor public key with the 
private key to calculate the link key for each neighbor 
sensor node.  
 
We assume that the public keys are calculated offline by a 
powerful device and loaded to sensor nodes before the 
deployment. This operation saves one point multiplication 
operation needed for calculating the public key from 
private key in each sensor node. The analysis of the per 
node total energy cost of this key establishment scheme 
can also be divided into two parts as communication and 
computation costs. 
 
 
3.2.1 Communication Cost of ECDH 
The number of messages sent and received for ECDH key 
establishment is the same as the shared key discovery of 
BS since any node pair can establish a shared key with the 
probability of 1. Therefore, the message complexities 
defined in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 are also valid for 
ECDH key establishment. Here, each node vi (i = 
1,2,3,…,n) transmits at most a single broadcast ( pollL ) and 
neighborΕ  unicast ( replypollL _ ) messages. Furthermore, each 
node receives neighborΕ  broadcast ( pollL ) and neighborΕ  
unicast ( replypollL _ ) messages from its neighbors. The 
length of the messages used for security operations is 160 
bits and it is the same for both broadcast and unicast. 
Consequently, the total messaging cost of the ECDH is 
calculated as below: 
 
+Ε+=Μ )( _ replypollneighborpolltx LLCC neighbor                        
              )( _ replypollpollneighborrx LLC +Ε                                 (15) 
3.2.2 Computational Cost of ECDH 
In ECDH key establishment protocol, total amount of 
computation is Eneighbor point multiplications needed for 
establishing shared keys with the one hop distant neighbor 
nodes. 
3.2.3 Total Energy Cost of ECDH 
The message payload structure used in the energy cost 
analysis of the ECDH was: 
},,{,,,: MIDIDMACMIDIDBA BABA→  
 
The poll message ( pollL ) contains the 160 bits public key 
of the source node. If the expected physical node degree 
Eneighbor is d, then there are d neighbors replying to this 
broadcast message. Each reply message ( replypollL _ ) 
includes the public key of the sender which is also 160 bits 
in length. After adding the 16 bits IDs and 160 bits MAC 
values, total messaging cost given in Eq. (15) can be 
rewritten as below:  
 
)2)(192160()1)(192160( dCdCC rxtxneighbor ++++=Μ               
           dCdC rxtx 704)1(352 ++=                                    (16)       
 
When the calculation cost per node is considered, the cost 
equation is simple since the public and private key pairs 
are generated by a powerful device and loaded before the 
deployment and there is only a single point multiplication 
computed for each node during the key establishment. If 
the number of physical neighbors is d, then the total 
computation cost is: 
 
Ccomputation = d 160ECDHC                                      (17) 
 
The message length used in the SHA-1 MAC computation 
can be calculated by excluding the 160 bit MAC extension 
included in the communication cost defined in Eq. (16). So 
the total energy cost for SHA-1 computation is calculated 
as below: 
 
))2)(32160()1)(32160((11 ddCC SHAM SHA ++++= −−               
         )576192(1 dCSHA += −                                             (18)  
 
Then, by using the equations Eq. (16), Eq. (17), Eq. (18) 
the overall per node energy cost of ECDH for vi (i = 1,2,3, 
…,n) is calculated as below: 
 
1−
++= Μ SHAneighbor Mncomputatioionconfigurat CCCC                             (19) 
3.2.4 Cross Layer Implementation of ECDH 
Since the links to be secured are controlled by the network 
configuration protocol there may be no need for A to 
establish a secure link with all of its neighbors for an 
acceptable network connectivity performance. Here, we 
can apply reactive and proactive link selection methods 
for ECDH also.  
 
--For the proactive selection all the possible links among 
the neighbors are tried to be secured which will provide 
the same connectivity performance of the network 
configuration protocol without security implementation.  
 
 
 
Fig. 3 Message transactions for ECDH.  
 
A 1,2,3,…,d
[PuA]
[Pu1], [Pu2],…,[Pui] | 
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--With the reactive selection, only the links to the floating 
neighbors are tried to be secured.  
 
Since the link key probability is 1 for the ECDH, if the 
physical node degree is selected as low as possible, then 
the computation cost could be reduced accordingly. This 
basic algorithm is provided in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: ECDH cross layer algorithm 
Assumptions: Network is G = (V;E), there is no node failure during configuration 
1:  BEGIN: 
2:       BROADCAST poll with Puv for neighbor discovery and start neighbor   
      discovery timer 
3:       /*proactive: all neighbors reply; reactive: only floating neighbors reply*/ 
4:       RECEIVE poll_reply and Puu from u  
5:       Kuv ← Puu Pu 
6:  END: 
 
The simulation results of these implementations and their 
impacts on security and network configuration 
performance have been provided in Section 4. 
3.2.5 Analysis of Signature Schemes for ECDH  
The candidate protocols for implementing signature 
operations on ECDH key establishment protocol are RSA 
and ECDSA. Per unit energy costs of these protocols for 
Mica2dot sensor nodes are provided in Table 6 [11]. In 
this table, it can be realized that RSA signature generation 
operation is 13 times more costly than that of ECDSA 
protocol. However, the cost of RSA verification is about 3 
times cheaper than ECDSA verification. Here, it can be 
assumed that the signature generation operations can be 
handled by a powerful device and the resulting signatures 
can be loaded to sensor nodes before deployment. In this 
case, RSA protocol is the most cost effective solution 
since its computational asymmetry is in favor of the 
signature verification.   
 
Since ECDH is the most effective public key 
establishment protocol suitable for WSN [11], hybrid 
operation of ECDH and RSA can provide the most cost 
effective solution for authenticated key establishment 
using public key cryptography. Such a hybrid 
implementation has been proposed in [19] for mobile 
devices. On the other hand, using two different 
asymmetric protocols for one application adds another cost 
which is the program memory allocation. Since the 
signature verification operations are handled during the 
configuration, it is enough to implement just the public 
key operations of RSA in sensor nodes. In [18] it has been 
stated that the implementation of public key operations 
occupies only 1Kbyte of program memory for an 8 bits 
microcontroller. In that work, it has also been stated that 
the implementation of 160 bits ECC operations occupies 
3,68 Kbyte of program memory for the same platform. 
Additionally, the maximum length of the RSA signature 
message equals to the RSA key length which is 1024 bits 
in our case [11]. Thus, the additional energy costs of the 
signature operations to the ECDH key establishment are 
the 1024 bit RSA signature message added to the 
transactions defined in Fig. 3 and the signature verification 
computation cost which is 50% of the ECDH key 
establishment. 
 
Table 6: Asymmetric computation costs for Mica2dot 
Signature Generation Verification 
RSA 1024 304mJ 11,9mJ 
ECDSA 160 22,82mJ 45,09mJ 
Key establishment Client Server 
RSA 1024 15,04mJ 304mJ 
ECDSA 160 22,3mJ 22,3mJ 
4. Simulation Results 
In this section we provide the simulation results and 
performance comparisons of the cross layer 
implementations of key agreement protocols with the 
network configuration protocol. The simulation platform is 
based on Omnet++ [20] discrete event simulator. Results 
are averaged from 10 different runs each has a different 
random seed to create a different 2D uniform deployment. 
The maximum cluster size parameter of the network 
configuration protocol [16] has been set to 32. 
 
The main purpose of the simulations is to measure the total 
number of bits to be transmitted and received and the 
number of computations to be made for key establishment. 
Using the measurement results, we calculated the total 
energy cost of transmission and computation based on the 
unit energy costs measured for Mica2dot sensors [10][11] 
provided in Table 2, 3 and 6. The resilience performance is 
calculated according to the following rules: a) When a 
node is compromised, all the secure links connected to this 
node and the other links that are using the keys stored in 
that node are assumed to be compromised, b) In BS, since 
path keys are encrypted with the shared keys stored in 
sensor nodes during transmission, if these shared keys 
used for encrypting the path keys are compromised, then 
the corresponding path keys are also compromised.  
 
We have first investigated the performance of the cross 
layer implementation of the BS. The selected network 
configuration parameters for this simulation are: n = 2000, 
d = 8 and P = 10.000. For these parameters key index (idx) 
and node ID numbers are represented in 16 bits. We have 
measured the network connectivity, total number of 
messages and computations of straight, reactive and 
proactive link selection methods for different key ring 
sizes. Then, we calculated the overall energy costs based 
on the unit costs provided in Table 2 and 3.  
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In Fig. 4, we have provided the graphical representations 
of the analysis and simulation results of the total energy 
cost of BS for the given network configuration parameters. 
We have obtained the analysis results by multiplying the 
per node energy cost provided in Eq. (14) with the network 
size n. The simulation result has been obtained by 
implementing the BS to the network configuration 
protocol without applying the cross layer link selection 
algorithm. We have used cascade-off counting method in 
this simulation since the analysis was made for this case. 
From Fig. 4, it can be realized that the simulation and the 
analysis results display mainly the same characteristics for 
BS. In this figure, the analysis result of the energy cost is 
higher than that of simulation because analysis includes 
duplicated key establishment processes for some links that 
cannot be eliminated which are decided in real time during 
the configuration. This duplicated calculation increases the 
total energy cost of the analysis. However, in simulations, 
we can prevent nodes to establish duplicate keys for 
already configured links in real time. As a result, the 
simulation results have relatively lower energy costs. 
Hence, we can take the analysis result of the 
implementation of BS as an upper bound for the total 
energy cost calculated for cascade-off counting.  
 
 
 
From Fig. 5 to Fig. 7 we have provided the simulation 
results of the cross layer implementation of BS for the 
defined network parameters. In Fig. 5, the straight link 
selection requires a key ring of size 160 to achieve the 
99% global network connectivity whereas, proactive and 
reactive methods need a much smaller key ring size 
(around 100) for the same level of global connectivity.   
 
As it can be seen in Fig. 6, total energy cost of the key 
establishment is the lowest with the straight method. This 
result is due to the fact that straight method needs no 
messaging for the path key establishment. However, each 
sensor node should keep a key ring of size 160x128 = 
20.480 bits (2.560 bytes) in its memory. Also, increasing 
the key ring size stored in each sensor node reduces the 
network resilience. On the other hand, eventhough the 
energy cost of the path key establishment is relatively 
higher, cost of the reactive method is about 13% less than 
that of proactive link selection for k = 100. Moreover, it 
provides almost equal global network connectivity (Fig. 5) 
and resilience (Fig. 7) compared with the proactive link 
selection. However, the overall resilience of the system is 
very low even for the smallest possible key ring size is 
selected for the configuration. For example, it is enough to 
capture 100 nodes from the network to compromise the 
75% of the total links established with the proactive link 
selection method as shown in Fig. 7 (for k = 100). The 
reason of this low resilience is because of the selected key 
pool size. To increase the resilience, the key pool size P 
should be increased to reduce the possibility of established 
link keys to be in the compromised set of keys. 
 
 
 
 
 
We have also simulated the cross layer implementation of 
BS for enlarged key pool size P = 100.000 which is 
necessary to increase the overall resilience achieved with 
P = 10.000. However, increasing the key pool size will 
also cause the energy costs to increase because of the 
longer key rings to be transmitted and received for 
achieving the desired global connectivity. In Fig. 8, we 
have provided the global connectivity performance results 
 
Fig. 6 BS configuration energy cost for P = 10.000. 
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Fig. 5 BS global connectivity for P = 10.000. 
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Fig. 4 BS cost analysis verification for P = 10.000. 
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for this simulation. Here, the key index can be represented 
in 17 bits. As it can be realized from the Fig. 8, the size of 
the key ring, required for the 99% global connectivity 
increases from 160 to 500 for the straight method. 
However, proactive and reactive methods can achieve this 
global connectivity with the key ring size around 300 
instead of 100. Hence, increasing the key pool size 
increases the required key ring size to be stored in sensor 
memory. This also increases the total communication costs 
especially during the path key discovery. As shown in Fig. 
9, total energy costs for P = 100.000 almost triples the 
costs for P = 10.000 provided in Fig. 6. The total energy 
cost of the reactive method is again around 15% less than 
that of proactive method because of the reduced path key 
establishment rounds together with the cross layer link 
selection. 
 
 
 
 
 
On the other hand, the overall resilience of the system is 
increased considerably as shown in Fig. 10. In this case, it 
is needed to capture around 300 nodes from the network, 
which was 100 for P = 10.000, to compromise the 75% of 
the total links established with the proactive link selection 
(k = 300). This resilience characteristic is the same for 
both proactive and reactive methods which is better than 
the value 81% achieved with the straight method. The 
reason of this improvement is the smaller key rings stored 
in each node for proactive and reactive methods which 
reduce the probability of including established link keys in 
these key rings. 
 
 
 
 
 
We observed from the simulations that the overall energy 
cost of BS comes mostly from the radio transmissions and 
the SHA-1 MAC calculation costs. To achieve a better 
resilience the key pool size can be increased more, but in 
this case the number of keys to be stored in each of the 
sensor nodes has to be increased for the desired local 
connectivity. Then, the total energy cost increases because 
of the transmission of long key ring indexes. 
 
The performance of the cross layer implementation of 
ECDH key establishment is provided in Table 7.  
 
Table 7: ECDH key agreement costs 
Link Type Connectivity Energy 
Proactive 99,34% 0,42 kJ 
Reactive 99,25% 0,40 kJ 
 
For this simulation the selected network configuration 
parameters are: N = 2000 and d = 8. Here, node ID 
numbers are represented in 16 bits. We have measured the 
network connectivity and total number of messages and 
computations of reactive and proactive link selection 
 
 
Fig. 10 BS resilience for P = 100.000. 
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Fig. 9 BS configuration energy cost for P = 100.000. 
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Fig. 8 BS global connectivity for P = 100.000. 
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Fig. 7 BS resilience for P = 10.000. 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
1 
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 
C
om
pr
om
iz
ed
 L
in
ks
 
Number of Nodes Compromized 
Straight 
Reactive 
Proactive 
IJCSI International Journal of Computer Science Issues, Vol. 8, Issue 6, No 2, November 2011 
ISSN (Online): 1694-0814 
www.IJCSI.org 97
  
methods. Then, we calculated the overall energy costs 
based on the unit costs provided in Table 2, 3 and 5.  
 
Simulation results indicate that the connectivity 
performances of the proactive and reactive methods are 
also the same for ECDH which are above 99%. In this 
case, the total energy cost of the reactive method is about 
5% less than that of the proactive method. The ECDH 
energy cost simulation results given in Table 7 matches 
with the 0,43 kJ computed using  Eq. (19). The small 
difference is because of the duplicated message costs 
counted in the analysis. The interesting result here is that 
the total energy cost of the ECDH implementation to 
achieve   99%  network connectivity is about 20% less 
than that of BS (P = 100.000 and k = 300) for both 
proactive and reactive link selection methods. As shown in 
Fig. 11, the resilience of the ECDH is also much better 
than BS such that to compromise the 75% of the total 
secure links, 1000 nodes are needed to be compromised 
from the network. 
 
 
 
When we consider the network connectivity and total 
energy cost characteristics with the increasing network 
size, Fig. 12 provides the simulation results of the BS and 
ECDH running in reactive mode. Here, we have selected 
key pool size as P = 100.000 and key ring size as k = 300 
for BS. The selected node degree of the network is the 
same with the previous test beds. In Fig. 12-(a) the 
network connectivity performance is almost the same for 
both implementations with only small differences. The 
global connectivity is below 99% with the network size of 
400 because of the border conditions but it is always above 
99% for the sizes starting from 1200. Thus, it can be stated 
here that the connectivity results of the key establishment 
protocol implementations are independent from the 
network size. 
 
The energy cost characteristics provided in Fig. 12-(b) 
illustrate that as the network size increases, energy costs 
increase linearly for both key establishment protocols. 
However, the rate of increase for the BS is about 30% 
higher than that of ECDH. Consequently, reactive cost of 
ECDH is over performing the reactive cost of BS in terms 
of the overall network energy usage when establishing 
keys among sensor nodes while keeping the network 
configuration performance at an acceptable level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The simulation results so far reflect the analysis of 
different BS and ECDH key establishment setups over the 
network configuration protocol [16] when the physical 
node degree is 8. For this node degree the key ring size 
should be enlarged for BS so that the local connectivity is 
close to the physical node degree to achieve the global 
connectivity of 99%. On the other hand, for ECDH, there 
is no special configuration change required to fulfill the 
global and local connectivity requirements. We have 
observed from these results that with the key pool size of P 
= 10.000 BS always has the lower energy costs compared 
to ECDH but the achieved resilience is just 10% of ECDH. 
If the key pool size is increased to 100.000, resilience 
performance of BS is still below ECDH but it increases 
considerably. However, BS loses its energy cost advantage 
over reactive link selection with ECDH especially with the 
 
 
Fig. 11 Resilience performance of ECDH for reactive method. 
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Fig. 12 (a) Network connectivity and (b) Energy cost characteristics of 
reactive BS and ECDH for the increasing network size. 
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reactive link selection (for example if k = 300). At this 
point, one can propose to use the straight method with 
higher key ring sizes (k ≥ 500) which keeps the energy 
cost advantage for BS but in this case resilience levels 
become worse because of the increased key ring size as 
shown in Fig. 10.  
 
In addition, ECDH resilience depends only on the network 
size but BS resilience depends on key pool P and key ring 
k sizes. That is if network size is increased while keeping 
P and k the same, BS resilience characteristic will be the 
same as in Fig. 10 but ECDH resilience changes. For 
example, if the network size is increased to n = 20.000, 
compromising 1000 nodes results in compromising whole 
network for BS but for ECDH only 10% of the links are 
compromised. This is the main advantage of ECDH over 
BS especially for the large scale networks. 
 
In order to complete the cost characteristics of BS and 
ECDH implementations over the network configuration 
protocol we have investigated the energy cost 
characteristics when the physical node degree increases. 
Table 8-a provides the simulation results of the energy 
costs of BS for the physical node degrees of d = {8, 13, 
18} for the key pool size P = 100.000 and the global 
connectivity above 98%. For this simulation we have set 
the network size as n = 400 because of the simulator 
limitations and due to the border conditions we have set 
the global connectivity limit to 98%. For the comparison 
we have used the reactive ECDH energy cost 0,074kJ 
which is calculated for d = 8 and n = 400. Here, this 
energy cost is assumed to be fixed for higher node degrees 
as the total number of neighbors securely connected with 
ECDH is 8 and it does not change. Increasing the physical 
node degree adds extra polling messages to the overall cost 
but this messaging cost is negligible when it is compared 
to the total ECDH energy costs. From the results in Table 
8-a, straight link selection cost of BS almost equals to the 
ECDH key establishment cost for d = 8 but reactive link 
selection energy cost of BS is higher. For d = 13, BS 
straight link selection cost is 27% less than ECDH reactive 
cost and it becomes feasible against ECDH at this point. 
The decrease in BS straight link selection energy cost 
continues with d = 18 but the decrease rate is slower due to 
the closer key ring lengths achieving the same connectivity 
performances for d = 13 and d =18. However, BS reactive 
link selection cost increases as the node degree increases. 
The reason is that, as the physical node degree increases, 
the number of neighbors participating to the phase key 
discovery phase of BS increases (all physical neighbors) 
and this increases the total communication cost. However, 
in the straight link selection only the neighbors having 
shared key in their key rings responds and this removes the 
unnecessary communication with other neighbors. 
Actually, this advantage is not valid for d = 8 because each 
node needs to connect to all of its neighbors for the desired 
network connectivity performance. However, for d > 8 
only a portion of the physical neighbors is enough and 
there is no need to establish a secure link with the others 
which results in a reduction in the total energy cost.  
 
We have repeated the simulations for d =13 and d = 18 by 
setting the key ring size as k = 500 for the BS straight link 
selection and we have obtained the total energy costs 
0,08kJ and 0,11kJ respectively. Then ECDH simulations 
have been repeated by allowing secure link connection 
with all the physical neighbors without any limitation and 
then we have obtained the total energy costs of 0,096kJ 
and 0,14kJ respectively. As it can be realized from Table 
8-b, if the network configuration requires maximum local 
connectivity achievable when d = 18, BS straight selection 
cost is becoming about 20% lower than the ECDH reactive 
cost. This difference is very low when d = 8 which is 
ignorable. On the other hand, for the BS reactive selection, 
energy costs are increasing considerably to the levels of 
0,2kJ and 0,3kJ. From these results it is clear that for the 
node degrees d ≥ 13, Straight link selection with BS has 
the advantage over reactive implementation of ECDH. 
However, for the node degree of d = 8, straight link 
selection cost of BS almost equals to the ECDH reactive 
cost. Thus, because of its better resilience ECDH would be 
preferred for the node degree level of d = 8. But for the 
higher node degrees straight link selection with BS would 
be the choice because of its lower energy cost.  
 
Table 8: Energy costs versus increasing physical node degree 
(a) Minimum Local Connectivity 
BS d = 8 Straight Reactive 
Key ring size 500 300 
Energy cost 0,071kJ 0,092kJ 
BS d = 13 Straight Reactive 
Key ring size 300 160 
Energy cost 0,055kJ 0,155kJ 
BS d = 18 Straight Reactive 
Key ring size 250 100 
Energy cost 0,048kJ 0,245kJ 
ECDH Straight Reactive 
Energy cost --- 0,074kJ 
(b) Maximum Local Connectivity 
BS d = 8 BS Straight 
BS 
Reactive 
ECDH 
Reactive 
Key ring size 500 300 --- 
Energy cost 0,071kJ 0,092kJ 0,074kJ 
BS d = 13 BS Straight 
BS 
Reactive 
ECDH 
Reactive 
Key ring size 500 300 --- 
Energy cost 0,08kJ 0,21kJ 0,096kJ 
BS d = 18 BS Straight 
BS 
Reactive 
ECDH 
Reactive 
Key ring size 500 300 --- 
Energy cost 0,11kJ 0,33kJ 0,14kJ 
 
Finally, Table 9 provides the energy cost results of the 
ECDH & RSA authenticated key establishment operations 
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for n = 2000 and d = 8. According to these results, the 
reactive link selection cost of the ECDH & RSA hybrid 
implementation is 50% higher than that of ECDH only key 
establishment. However, this cost is only 20% higher than 
that of BS for the given configuration parameters (reactive 
selection with P = 100.000 and k = 300) and it is paid only 
once in the beginning of the configuration. Thus, this 
additional cost can be affordable for the sensor networks 
requiring strong security services since it provides a well 
proven authentication and a very good resilience compared 
to BS.  
 
Table 9: ECDH and RSA signature hybrid implementation costs 
Link Selection ECDH160 + RSA1024 
Proactive 0,71kJ 
Reactive 0,66kJ 
5. Conclusions 
In this work we have provided the design and analysis of 
the implementations of BS [2] and ECDH [9] over the 
network configuration protocol proposed in [16] and 
measured the performances under different configuration 
parameters. By using the cross layer relations between key 
establishment and network configuration protocols, we 
have proposed three different link selection methods, 
straight, reactive and proactive, for securing the links at 
the configuration time. We have simulated the 
performance of these cross layer implementations for 
different setups by changing network size, key pool size, 
key ring size and node degrees.  
 
Simulation results indicate that the cost of the key 
establishment protocols can be improved by using the state 
control mechanism provided by the network configuration 
protocol. The cost of BS can be reduced about 15% by 
selectively securing the links at configuration time. This 
reduction is 5% for ECDH.  When the key pool size is 
10.000 then the total energy cost of the BS is always better 
than ECDH but the resilience performance is only 10% of 
ECDH. For the minimum local connectivity target (d = 8), 
which provides 99% global connectivity for the network 
configuration protocol, if the key pool size is increased to 
100.000 then the resilience performance of BS becomes 
closer to the performance of ECDH but its total energy 
cost increases due to the increase in the total transmission 
cost. For instance, when the key ring of size is 500, 
straight link selection cost of BS is almost equal to the 
ECDH reactive cost and BS reactive link selection cost is 
25% higher for the key ring size of 300.  
 
Simulation results investigating the node degree and 
energy cost relations of BS and ECDH over the network 
configuration protocol indicate that reactive link selection 
cost of ECDH is in range of straight link selection cost of 
BS if the node degree is set to the minimum (d = 8). If the 
node degree increases, then BS and ECDH energy costs 
also increase but straight link selection cost of BS becomes 
20% lower than the ECDH reactive cost and the reactive 
link selection cost of BS almost doubles. Then, it can be 
stated here that for the minimum node degree requirement 
of the network configuration protocol (d = 8), ECDH is a 
good choice for the key establishment. For higher node 
degrees BS has a better energy cost performance and can 
be the preferred choice.  
 
On the other hand, the resilience that can be achieved by 
BS is not as good as ECDH even with the key pool size of 
100.000.  To increase the resilience, key pool size can be 
increased more but this causes the key rings to be larger 
which results in higher energy costs. Besides, because of 
the key rings needed to be stored in each sensor node, BS 
suffers from the local storage overhead. The path key 
discovery phase can reduce this overhead but it also 
increases the transmission cost. So if the security is the 
prime concern and requires high resilience performance, 
then ECDH still can be a good choice even for the higher 
node degrees.  
 
In addition, it should be noted that increasing the node 
degree will increase the total system cost especially for 
large scale WSN. Since the network configuration protocol 
allows 99% global network connectivity with the node 
degree of d = 8 this would be the best configuration 
parameter to build the network. Then ECDH is becoming 
the best choice for this configuration setup. On the other 
hand, cross implementation of ECDH is fairly easy since 
each communicating party can establish a link key 
directly. For this case, each node needs to store only public 
and private keys having total size of only 40 bytes which is 
ignorable. In addition, hybrid implementation of ECDH 
and RSA can be used for authenticated key establishment 
in return for an acceptable cost and this operation could 
provide even more security by adding the pairwise 
authentication to the key establishment.  
 
As a result, the cross layer implementation of key 
establishment with the network configuration can give 
more realistic performance results and there can be 
improvements on operational costs by reducing the 
number of links to be secured without affecting the 
configuration targets. For the optimum configuration 
parameters of the network configuration protocol [16] 
ECDH is the best performing key establishment protocol 
compared to BS. Moreover, ECDH and RSA hybrid 
implementation can be used for higher security needs. 
These results can be generalized to the network 
configuration protocols which can achieve a global 
connectivity of 99% with the physical node degrees of 
around 8.  
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